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PUBLIC POLICY AND PERSONAL OPINION
T HE real relation of economics to law, only recently acquiring
positive recognition, is illuminated by the varying decisions
in regard to attempted restrictions on the enjoyment of personal
property.
A certain narrow theory of law predicates its specific rules on a
Divine preordination, which makes their eternal immutability tran-
scendent of human ideas of utility. "Precedents and rules must be
followed even when they are flatly absurd and unjust, if they are
agreeable to ancient principles." Practically, however, the matter
of current utility does affect the decision of cases, even in the face
of precedent. Lord Haldane but put this fact into words when he
said,' "I think that there are many things of which the judges are
bound to take judicial notice which lie outside the law properly
so called, and among those things are what is called public policy
and the changes which take place in it. The law itself may become
modified by this obligation of the judges." Some rules of law, he
said, without drawing the line of distinction, like the Rule against
Perpetuities, have become "a crystallized proposition forming part
of the ordinary common law, so definite that it must be applied
without reference to whether a particular case involves the real
mischief to guard against which the rule was originally introduced."
But between these rules and those "in which the principle of public
policy has never crystallized into a definite or exhaustiVe set of
propositions, there lies an intermediate class. Under this third
category fall the instances in which public policy has partially pre-
cipitated itself into recognized rules which belong to law properly
so called, but where these rules have remained subject to the mould-
ing influence of the real reasons of public policy from which they
proceeded."
There can be no question but that where no rule at all has been
definitely precipitated, judicial decisions are time and again founded
on nothing but the judicial apprehension, or conception,, of public
policy. Every adjudication that some novel statute does or does
not constitute "due process of law" is of this type. And there are
1 Rodriguez v. Speyer Bros., 88 L. J. K. B. 147, ii9, L. T. 409 (ix98).
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not infrequent instances, some of which Lord Haldane cites, in
which definite rules of precedent have been disregarded or modified
through judicial. view of public policy.2
Example, were it necessary, is found in the decisions concerning
attempts to restrict an owner's enjoyment of personal property.-"
But these cases are even more apt as illustrating how amorphous
and absolutely unauthenticated is the substance of this so-called
public policy upon which such changes are justified.
The earliest cited authority in these cases is the statement of
Coke3 wherein he says, "And so it is if a man be possessed of a
lease for years, or of a house, or of any other chattel real or per-
sonal, and give or sell his whole interest or property therein, upon
condition that the donee or vendee shall not alien the same, the
same is void, because his whole interest or property is out of him,
so as he has no possibility of a reverter, and it is against trade and
traffic, and bargaining and contracting between man and man. * * *"
If Coke meant that such restrictions do not bind the owner, as
'An instance of the latter is found in Bechuanaland Co. v. London Bank
[18W8], 2 Q. B. 658, in which the court held certain instruments to be nego-
tiable because of the prevailing custom of dealers therein, despite the fact
that the custom was not part of the old law merchant and that such instru-
ments had been theretofore judicially declared not negotiable. Occasionally
the actuality of the change is covered in a way that Max Beerbohm might
aptly call "inerubilous." Witness Brooklyn City & N. R. Co. v. National
Bank, io2 U. S. I4. The plaintiff was the pledgee of a promissory note
which he had taken subsequent to the loan for which he claimed it as
security, and for which he had given no other consideration. The court's
argument seems to be as follows: Only holders for value are protected
against equities; the pledgee of a note as security for a preexisting debt
ought to be protected as a matter of public policy; therefore, such pledgee
is a holder for value.
'It may be said that these decisions involve no change of "law," but
only diverse "conclusions"; that they involve the minor premise, "what is
contrary to public good," while the major premise, that assumed obligations
which are contrary to public good cannot be enforced, is unaffected. In
view, however, of the tendency of courts to declare themselves bound by
prior conclusions of this sort, where the facts admit of any generalization
at all, the precedents in which certain types of contracts are held not to
conflict with public policy seem properly to be treated as expressive of a
rule, and therefore, in one sense, of law. But whether the decisions are
called one thing or another does not affect the gist of this di cussion.
'CoKx ON LiTLYoN, Art. 360, Vol. II [U. H. Thomas' Ed.], p. 26.
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owner, and was referring only to their lack of effectiveness at law,
his statement has been consistently followed.4
But in equity there has been apparent disagreement with it.- The
opposite view appears in De Mattos v. Gibson.6  One Curry had
mortgaged a ship to Gibson, by virtue of which mortgage Gibson
had a legal right to sell the vessel. But he knew at the time of
taking the mortgage that Curry was under obligation to De Mattos
to use the vessel in a certain way. De Mattos asked an injunction
which, among other things, should restrain Gibson from selling the
vessel otherwise than subject to the use for which Curry had con-
tracted. The injunction was denied because the plaintiff had lost
what equitable rights he might have had. But the court expressly
said that if Gibson had shown an intent to cause Curry to break
his contract, by selling the vessel without subjection to the con-
tract, the court would have restrained him. In such case, there
would have -been an enforceable limitation upon Gibson's right of
alienation, in favor of one who had no ownership and with whom
Gibson was not in privity of contract.
This has been the actual decision in two New York cases. In
New York Bank Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank Note Co.T the Kidder
Press Co. had contracted with the plaintiff not to sill machines
made according to its patents to anyone except the plaintiff. It
did sell, however, to the defendant, who knew of the agreement.
"In conflict with it, however, are Stewart v. Williams, 2 Md. 425, and
French v. Old South Society, io6 Mass. 179. A notable exception also is
the growing tendency of courts and legislatures to look with favor upon
"spendthrift trusts," and to hold such restrictions on alienation to be valid.
See GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATIONS [2nd ed.].
'The distinction between the legal and equitable effect is spoken of in
Matter of Petition of Argus Co., 138 N. Y. 557. The parties had agreed
that no one of them would sell his stock in a certain company without first
offering it,.at a fair price, to the others. One of them did sell, in disregard
of this agreement, and the buyer of the stock voted it at an election of
directors. The suit involved the validity of this election. The court held
that although the agreement might be valid and equity might even have
enjoined its breach, nevertheless "the transfer to Speer vested in him the
legal title to the shares, although they were not transferred on the books
of the company," and he had the legal right to vote the stock.
a4 De Gex and Jopes, 276 (1858).
128 App. Div. 411, 83 Hun. 593 (i898).
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Because of its knowledge of this agreement not to sell, the defend-
ant was enjoined from using machines already purchased and the
Kidder company was restrained from selling any others. The same
thing was held in Murphy v. Christian Press, etc., Co.' in the fol-
lowing year. The Catholic Publication Society had contracted with
the plaintiff that it would not sell books printed from certain plates
at less than a stated price. The Catholic company's receiver, in
dissolution, sold the plates to the defendant, who knew of the terms
of the contract. The defendant was enjoined from selling books
below the stated price, although there was no contract between it
-and the plaintiff. The agreement, stated the court, "although tech-
nically a personal one, related to the use of its property, the copy-
right and plates, and obligated all who might acquire that property
with notice of the agreement. This is the settled doctrine of the
Court of Appeals where the agreement relates to real estate. We
can see no reason why the same rule should not apply in the case
of personal property."9
But the New York judicial idea of public policy, although in
accord with that of the court in De Mattos v. Gibson, supra, was
ignored by the English court in Taddy & Co. v. Sterious & Co.'0
a few years later. The plaintiff was a manufacturer of tobacco
which he sold to wholesalers on their promise that it should not
be resold below a stated price. The defendant had bought from a
wholesaler, with knowledge of this limitation on the right to resell.
There was no privity of contract, the court held, between plaintiff
and defendant, and injunction against reselling below the stated
price was denied on the statement, as reported without discussion
or elaboration, that "conditions of this kind did not run with the
goods and could not be imposed on them."
The Massachusetts court also has differed from the New York
judges in its view of the policy of such limitations upon ownership
and ignored the New York decisions, saying, "This right (to con-
838 N. Y. App. Div. 426 (1899).
'In Clemens v. Estes, 22 Fed. 899 (1885), the only reason given for
refusing injunction against the third person was that he had no knowledge
of the restriction. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Goldthwait, 133 Fed. 7-04
(19o4), an injunction against one who did know of the contract was allowed.
20 o T. L. R. 102 (I903).
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trol the re-sale price) is founded on the personal contract alone,
and it can be enforced only against the contracting party. To say
that this contract is attached to the property and follows it through
successive sales which severally pass title, is a very different propo-
sition. We know of no authority nor of any sound principle which
will justify us in so holding."'1
The statement of Coke, as quoted above, is followed by the quali-
fication that this legal futility of restriction upon alienation is "to
be understood of conditions annexed to the grant or sale itself, in
respect of the repugnancy, and not to any other collateral thing, as
hereafter shall appear." This, too, courts both of law and equity
have followed, until recently, so far as to affirm the validity of
contracts whereby the alienation and enjoyment of chattels is
restricted.1
2
In Elliman Sons & Co. v. Carrington & Son," decided only two
years previous to Taddy v. Sterious, supra, and in no wise affected
by that decision that the restriction did not run with the ownership,
it appeared that the plaintiff had sold bottles of its patent medicine
to the defendant in consideration of the latter's agreement not to
resell them below a stated price. The defendant did resell below
that price, in disregard of his agreement, and the plaintiff sought
to restrain him. The defense was that the contract itself was
opposed to public policy and therefore void. The court considered
it unnecessary even to hear argument in support of the validity of
the contract, but held it valid, saying, "It is merely a question
whether a man is entitled, when he is selling his own goods, to
make a bargain as to the use to be made of them by the purchaser.
"Garst v. Hale, 179 Mass. 588 (igoi). Even Massachusetts, after this
decision, allowed injunction restraining the defendant from inducing the one
who was bound by such a contract from breaking it. Garst v. Charles, 187
Mass. 144 (T9o5). Thus the validity of the contract was recognized. The
Federal courts also have granted such injunctions. Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. Platt, 142 Fed. 6o6 (x9o6) ; Hartman v. John D. Park & Sons, 145 Fed.
358 (igo6) ; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Jaynes Drug Co., 149 Fed. 838 (igo6).
"This discussion does not relate to those numerous contracts whereby
the parties have attempted to restrict the production of goods, nor to those
whose purpose is to eliminate or reduce competition; e. g., agreements not
to reEnter business, or not to sell to certain persons, as in Park & Sons Co.
v. National Druggists' Asso., 175 N Y. i.
[1901] 2 Ch. Div. 275.
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It is said that the contract is against public policy; but that phrase
merely embodies, for the present purposes, the great principle of
restraint of trade, and to say that it is to prevent Messrs. Elliman
from exercising their own discretion seems to me to be applying a
well settled principle of law to facts to which it can not have any
possible application." So far as the report indicates, the plaintiff
was the only concern which made that particular medicine, and it
made similar contracts with all of its distributors.
In Garst v. Harris- the plaintiff was the manufacturer of Phenyo
Caffein. He sold bottles of it to the defendant on the agreement
that the latter should not resell below a set price. Here also the
plaintiff controlled the entire output of the particular article, and
there is nothing in the case to negative the presumption' that he
made similar contracts with all his customers. The contract was
held valid, in an action for damages from its breach, the court
saying, "When, as here, there is a secret composition, which the
defendant presumably would have no chance to sell at a profit at
all but for the plaintiff's permission, a limit to the license, in the
form of a restriction of the price at which he may sell, is proper
enough." In Garst v. Hale"5 such a restriction was held not to run
with the ownership, but in Garst v. Charles' the validity of the
contract as between the parties was again recognized.17
The New York courts have taken the same position,' s saying,
"There is nothing to prevent an individual from selling any prcp-
erty that he has at any price which he can get for it. Nor is there
any reason why an individual should not agree that he will not
sell property which he owns at the time of making the agreement,
or which he thereafter acquire 3, at less than at a fixed price."'9
1 177 Mass. 72 (igoo).
I179 Mass. 588 (igoi).
"187 Mass. z44 (i9o5).
Myer v. Estes, 164 Mass. 457 (1895), concerned the validity of a single
contract. The plaintiff had sold electrotype plates to the defendant on the
latter's promise neither to resell them nor to use them in other than a stipu-
lated way. The defendant did resell them, and the court held that as his
buyer, who had no notice of the agreement, took the title free from any
restrictions, the plaintiff was damaged and could recover at law.
"Walsh v. Dwight, 40 App. Div. 573 (1898).
" In Missouri, Griffith v. Lewis, 17 Mo. App. 6o2 (i885), the court held,
without deciding whether such a limitation was valid or not, that at least
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One of a regular system of contracts by which the manufacturers
of a certain brand of groceries bound their customers not to resell
below a stated price was upheld by the Kentucky courts in Com-
monwealth v. Grinstead.20 A contract by the buyer not to resell at
all was held valid and enforceable by the Texas court.2
The Federal courts also recognized such contracts as valid and
not in conflict with public policy. In Clemens v. Estes,23 an injunc-
tion to restrain a sub-buyer from reselling below the price set by
his seller's contract was refused only on the ground that the defend-
ant had no knowledge of the contract. In a similar decision in
Harrison v. Maynard,24 it was added that the contract itself would
have been enforceable. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Goldthwaite
5
and Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Platt,2 6 there was a specific recognition
of the contract as valid, although the plaintiff controlled the entire
output of such goods and apparently made similar contracts with
all his customers. In Hartman v. John D. Pork & Sons,2 7 there
was a similar holding, with the further express declaration that
such contracts got no peculiar validity from the fact that the article
concerned was made under a secret process.
28
In another case of the same year" the plaintiff had sold books
with a restriction that they should not be resold before a stated
time nor below a stated price. The court first declared that the
one who had disregarded it could not recover from the seller a rebate
promised on condition of its observance. Accord, N. Y. Ice Co. v. Parker,
21 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 3o2 (i86i).
011 Ky. 203, 56 L. R. A. 7o9 (igoi).
Ice Co. v. Brewing Asso., 8 Tex. Civ. App. i.
An agreement between owners of shares of stock in a corporation that
no one of them would sell within six months without the consent of all was
upheld in Williams v. Montgomery, 148 N. Y. 519 (1896). Accord, Hey v.
Dolphin, 36 N. Y. S. 627, 92 Hun. 23o (i895). Contra, Fisher v. Bush, 42
N. Y. Sup. Ct. 641 (i885). In Moore v. Bank of Commerce, 52 Mo. 377'
(1873), a by-law of a corporation imposing a restriction upon the power
of stockholders to sell their shares was held void.
=22 Fed. 899 (I885).
'6i Fed. 689 (1894).
25133 Fed. 794 (i9o4).
0 I42 Fed. 6o6 (igo6).
27145 Fed. 350 (906).
'Accord, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Jaynes Drug Co., I49 Fed. 838 (i9o6).
'Authors & Newspapers Asso. v. O'Gorman Co., 147 Fed. 616 (196).
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plaintiff had no peculiar right to restrain the resale because of any
copyright covering the books, and then held, that if the defendant
had notice of this restriction he was bound by it, saying, "It is said
that this restraint on alienation is contrary to public policy. I am
unable to see any inequity or violation of public policy in the
agreement by the purchaser that he will not resell it within a lim-
ited period."30
In Phillips v. Iola Portland Cement Co.,rl the court decided that
a contract between buyer and seller whereby the former agreed not
to resell at all outside of a stated territory, was neither an unlawful
restraint of trade nor obnoxious to the anti-trust law of I8O.
Thus the harmony of decision stood until the decision of the
Circuit Court of Appeals in John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartan.3 2
This court held that, while a single contract obligating the buyer
not to resell below a certain price would be valid, a system of con-
tracts whereby he attempted to control the resale price of his entire
output was contrary to public policy and the contracts were void.
The court's "distinction" of the prior decisions is decidedly unsat-
isfactory. The authority which it cites in support of the holding
consists of such cases as Prater v. Campbell, 3 to the effect that a
"warranty" in the sale of a chattel is personal to the buyer and
does not so run with the chattel as to give subsequent owners a
right of action. The court does not expressly consider the economic
effect of its decision, and justifies its conclusion by precedent. But
as precedent as a whole does not lead to the court's conclusion,
it is rather obvious that the court formed its own opinion as to
what public policy required and then sought to support it by prece-
dent. The case of Commonwealth v. Grinstead, supra, decided by
the same Kentucky court, in conflict with the decision of the Hart-
tman case, is ignored.3 4
"Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339 (1907), was decided on the
assumption that there was no contract relation at all between the parties,
and it was therefore unnecessary to consider the validity and effect of such
contracts.
31 125 Fed. 593 (1903).
32353 Fed. 24 (19o7).
a 11o Ky. 23.
"The court distinguishes Murphy v. Christian Press Co., supra, on the
ground that the restriction therein enforced acquired validity through the
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Even in the decision of the Supreme Court, 5 affirming the inva-
lidity of such contracts, the opinion is not based on any examina-
tion of, or argument as to, economic actualities, but rather upon
what the precedents that appealed to the court had held to be good
policy. o
The Federal courts have, of course, followed these latter deci-
sions3 7
The State courts, however, seem not to have been convinced of
the correctness of the Supreme Court's conclusion. In Ingersoll &
Bro. v. Hahne & Co.,"8 the plaintiff sought to'enjoin the defendant
from selling watches made by the plaintiff and sold by it only on
condition that buyers and subsequent owners should not resell
below a stated price. It does not appear that defendant was a
party to such a contract, but he did have notice of it. The case was
decided in part under a New Jersey statute, interpreted to prohibit
such acts as the defendant was charged with, but the court expressly
said, "On the argument there was, and in counsel's brief there is,
a long discussion as to whether the contract against pice cutting,
copyright, on the books-ignoring the statement by that court that it could
.see no reason why the same rule (that applied to real estate) should not
apply in the case of personal property"! The express finding in Authors &
Newspapers Asso. v. O'Gorman Co., supra, that the restriction acquired no
especial validity from the copyright was not referred to.
'Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Son, 220 U. S. 373 (1910).
' It is particularly odd that the Supreme Court should thus have itself
imposed a limitation upon freedom in individual contract, in view of the
hesitancy with which courts have permitted even legislatures to limit
freedom of contract in the interest of public good. Adair v. United States,
208 U. S. I61; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66; State v. Fire Creek
Coal & Coke Co., 33 W. Va. 188, et al.
'A contract of the Ford Motor Co. with a distributor to the effect that
the latter would not resell below a fixed price was held, without discussion,
to be "concededly" invalid. No mention was made of its being part of a
"system" of contracts. Ford Motor Co. v. Union Motor Sales Co., 225 Fed.
373 (1914); 244 Fed. 156 (9U)". It is interesting to note that after this
decision the Ford company changed its contracts so as to retain title in itself
as against its distributors, so that the latter became mere sales agents. The
obligation of these agents not to sell below the stated price was enforced in
Orebough v. New, 6 Ohio App. 4o4 (1917). So, also, Ford Motor Car Co.
v. Benj. E. Boone, Inc., 244 Fed. 335 (x917).
88 N. J. Fq. 2 (1917>; Affd. 1o8 At. 128.
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evidenced by the notice, is contrary to public policy and defendant
relies upon cases in the Supreme Court of the United States. * * :
I am now considering the public policy of the State of New Jersey
as distinguished from any public policy of the United States. * * *
After careful consideration, I have come to the conclusion that
upon the general proposition I agree with the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Holmes in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park
& Sons Co."
In CaliforniaP9 the court was asked to enjoin a buyer of olive-oil
from reselling at a price below that stipulated in his contract with
the seller, the plaintiff. It granted, the injunction on the ground
that such contracts restricting the resale price were perfectly valid,
at least so long as they did not affect the entire supply of the com-
modity. This was followed by Ghirardelli v. Hunsicker,40 uphold-
ing one of a system of contracts that the buyers of the plaintiff's
brand of chocolate should not resell below the price stated. The
decision was "distinguished" from the patent medicine cases on
the ground that in them the contracts covered the whole supply of
"Peruna," while in the instant case the contracts, although they
covered all of "Ghirardelli's," did not cover all chocolate."'
The cases involving chattels covered by a patent right properly
stand on a different basis from those just discussed. When an
article involves an invention protected by patent, the restriction
upon its owner's right of alienation, or of enjoyment, is imposed
by the patent statute. It is in no sense a contract restriction; it is
not created by the patentee, and has no relation to ownership as
such. The ownership of a chattel may be in one by virtue of his
creation of the chattel; there may be no suggestion of contract or
any other relation between him and a patentee. Yet, if the chattel
involves a patented invention, that owner is precluded from using
his chattel or selling it without permission of the patentee. "Own-
ership" of a chattel gives no right whatever either to use or to sell
that chattel, if it involves a patented invention. The patentee has
no right to the chattel itself.42 . Its owner is indubitably owner in
'Grogan v. Chafee, 156 Cal. 6ii (igog).
40I64 Cal. 355 (1912).
'See also Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. Swanson, 76 Wash. 649. Contra,
Hill Co. v. Gray & Worcester, 163 Mich. 12 (igio).
"2Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. io.
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every sense of the word, yet every patent decision holds that he
may be restrained from either using it or selling it without the
patentee's permission. As an exa,mple, in Dickerson v. Sheldong3
the defendant had bought certain chattels at a sale by the United
States g6vernment of articles which had been confiscated for non-
payment of customs duties. They embodied an invention patented
to plaintiff. On suit by the patentee the court held that the defend-
ant indubitably got "title" to the articles and the plaintiff had no
interest in them, but that the defendant could not sell them without
the plaintiff's permission.
44
If the patentee chooses to allow the owner of a chattel, involving
his invention, to use or sell the chattel at all, he is not bound to
grant unrestricted permission. "Owning the whole, he owns every
part." 45 On this theory that the patentee has a right absolutely to
exclude others from any .enjoyment of the invention, it has been
held that he may not only arbitrarily determine who may invade
his monopoly of enjoyment, but also how they may invade it. Thus,
he may permit a licensee to enjoy the invention in a particular
place only and only by himself, and the licensee will be restrained
from utilizing this invention elsewhere or with other persons. 4
So, the right to use and enjoy even machines made by the licensee
himself may be limited to a stated time, and even persons who
have bought the machines from such maker have no right to use
them after the stated period.47 He may effectively limit the licensee
as to the purpose for which he may use embodiments of the inven-
tion.45  Restrictions as to the territory within which a licensee may
use chattels embodying the invention are common.49  All these
restrictions on the use and enjoyment of chattels, it may be repeated,
"98 Fed. 621 (1899).
"A payment of damages for unwarranted use does not give the owner
right to use thereafter. Birdsell v. Shabiol, 112 U. S. 485.
Victor Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair, 123 Fed. 424 (igo3).
"Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788 (I869).
"Mitchell v. Hawley, 16 Wall. 544 (1872).
" Gamewell Fire-Arms Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 14 Fed. 235 (1882).
" Brush Elec. Co. v. Col. Elec. Lt. & Co., 52 Fed. 945 (1892). This
should not be confused with the fact that if one is given power to sell, with-
out restrictions, embodiments of the invention, his buyers do take without
restriction, although he, the. seller himself, may be limited as to where or
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are judicially sanctioned despite the ownership of the chattel by
the restricted user.
The price at which the licensee may sell chattels has been held a
valid limitation by the patentee in protection of his monopoly. So "a
patentee may reserve to himself as an ungranted part of his monop-
oly of sale the right to fix and control the prices at which jobbers
and dealers may sell the patented article to the public, and * * *
whoever, without permission, enters the reserved portion is an
infringer."50  A limitation that the licensee must not deal in goods
of other persons than the manufacturer- has been upheld." In
Heaton Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co.? 2
it was held that the patentee might restrict the licensee's authorized
invasion of his monopoly to the use of the chattel embodying it by
the latter in connection with other specified articles only. The inven-
tion in that case was of a button-fastening machine. The patentee
had no monopoly of the fasteners, but only of the machine for attach-
ing them. He sold such a machine to the defendant with the restric-
tion that if the defendant used it.he must use it only with fasteners
made by the plaintiff. The court held that its use with any other
fasteners was a use which had not been authorized by the patentee
and was therefore an infringement of the patented monopoly. "The
buyer of the machine," said the court, "undoubtedly obtains the
title to the materials embodying the invention. * * * But, as to the
how he may sell. The purchasers' rights follow from the fact that the pat-
entee has neither expressly nor impliedly put any restriction on their right
to invade the monopoly, so far as the chattel purchased is concerned, but
has by implication of fact opened it wide in respect to the particular chattel
bought. It is not because he is owner that the buyer has the unrestricted
enjoyment of it, but because in authorizing the licensee to pass title to him,
the patentee impliedly opened his monopoly. Adams v. Burke, i7 Wall. 453.
'Victor Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair, 123 Fed. 424 (I9O3). Accord,
Bement v. Natl. Harrow Co., I86 U. S. 7o (i9Ol) : "The very object of these
(patent) laws is monopoly, and the rule is, with few exceptions, that any
conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this kind
of property, imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the
right to manufacture or bse or sell the article, will be upheld by the courts.
The fact that the conditions in the contracts keep up the monopoly or fix
prices does not render them illegal."
' Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70.
Z'277 Fed. 288 (I896).
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right to use the invention, he is obviously a mere licensee. * **
The license defines the boundaries of a lawful use."
In 1911, however, the argument was advanced" that whenever
a patentee sells an embodiment of his invention-as distinct, per-
haps, from authorizing another to make one for himself ?-he can
not legally restrict the manner in which the buyer may use it. or
the extent of use. It had already long been decided that, in the
case of a sale without any express limitation, a .real permission to
use the thing freely is implied by the fact of the sale. But the argu-
ment now presented was that this freedom to use must be decreed
as a matter of law from every sale and that a patentee who chooses
to open up his monopoly at all, if he does so by a sale of a chattel,
must open it completely and without restriction. This argument
so impressed three of the court, justices White, Hughes, and
Lamar, that they accepted, it. The majority, however, Justice Day
taking no part, still held to the proposition that the patentee, since
he could exclude others from any use of such machines. might
restrict others to such limited use as he might see fit.
After this, 4 the Supreme Court held, without any disagreement,
that a combination of manufacturers to make and control the sale
of goods covered by various patents was not an illegal combi-
nation in restraint of trade, even though the combination licensed
outsiders to use the patented goods only on condition that such
licensees should not use similar goods of competitors.
Later in the same year. however, in the face of all this consist-
ently opposed authority, the Supreme Court held that a patentee
who, by selling goods to another implicitly permits him to im ade
the monopoly by resale, can not legally restrict him as to the price
at which he shall resell.55 No reason, either utilitarian or otherwise,
is presented, the whole discussion being merely a "distinction" of
opposing authority. Four Justices, McKenna, Holmes, Lurton, and
Van Devanter, dissented, without reported.opinion.
A few years later " the doctrine, that as the patentee owns the
whole of the monopoly he owns every part of it, was again denied,
"Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U. S. I.
'"U. S. v. Winslow, 227 U. S. 2=2 (1912).
"Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. I (1912).
Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U. S. 502 (i9i6).
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this time more explicitly. It was held that if a patentee by sale
impliedly authorizes the use of the chattel at all, he can not by
notice to owners of it limit the manner of their use of it and con-
fine them to use with stipulated materials. Again no reason is
given, except the final statement, that to recognize the validity of
the limitation "would be gravely injurious to that public interest,
which we have seen is more a favorite of the law than is the pro-
motion of private fortunes." Mr. Justice Holmes, who, with Jus-
tices McKenna and Van Devanter, was consistent in his dissent,
argued that the patentee's right to limit the extent to which he
would open his monopoly had "become a rule of property that law
and justice require to be retained," and that no danger to the public
interest had been shown sufficient to justify its denial.57
In this article there is intended no criticism of the merits of
these various decisions. The discussion has to do rather with the
manner in which some of them were reached. Between judge-
selected law and judge-made law there is a world of philosophic
'Accord with majority opinion, Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co.,
243 U. S. 49o (1916); Boston Store v. Am. Gramophone Co., 246 U. S. 8
(1917).
In United States v. Colgate Co., 25o U. S. 300, the defendant was indicted
for violation of the Sherman anti-trust act. It was alleged to have created
a combination of dealers and suppressed competition in the sale of its prod-
ucts. The facts were that it had sent to dealers lists of the price at which
its products should be sold to the public and had refused to sell to any
dealer who failed to conform to such list prices, and had required "assur-
ances" of adherence to the price requirements of those to whom it did sell.
The Supreme Court adopted the lower court's holding that no "contract"
between the defendarit was charged in the indictment, and that it was not
criminal for a manufacturer merely to refuse to sell his product except "with
the understanding that such customer will resell only at an agreed price."
In United States v. A. Schrader's Sons, Inc., Supreme Court, March I,
1920, the defendant was also charged with violation of the Sherman acL
It was charged with having entered into written contracts with all of its
purchasers that they would not resell below stated prices. The lower court
decided that there was nothing to distinguish this case from that of U. S.
v. Colgate, except that the agreements in that case were tacit, or oral, and
in this case the contracts were written, and that this was a distinction with-
out a difference. Accordingly, it sustained a demurrer to the indictment. The
Supreme Court, however, pointed out that no contract was charged in the
Colgate case, but only a refusal to sell to those who would not maintain
prices. The making of express contracts that the buyer would not resell
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distinction and some real difference. "Selection" presupposes that
the substance of whatever rule is followed has originated extrane-
ously to the judicial mind. Selection, while it does vest in the judge
a real discretionary power, is nevertheless antithetical to the idea
of free legislative power in the judiciary.
Decisions which are wholly pragmatic and have no foundation in
either precedent or definite custom must be, at their very best, on
the border line between selection and creation. The grave objec-
tion to such decisions is expressed by Baron Parke" in his state-
ment that "public policy" is "a vague and unsatisfactory term, and
calculated to lead to uncertainty and error, when applied to the
decision of legal rights; it is capable of being understood in differ-
cut senses; it may, and does, in its ordinary sense, mean 'political
expediency,' or that which is best for the common good of the com-
munity; and in that sense there may be every variety of opinion,
according to education, habits, talents, and dispositions of each per-
son, who is to decide whether an act is against public policy or not.
To allow this to be a ground of judicial decision would lead to the
greatest uncertainty and confusion. It is the province of the states-
man, and not the lawyer," to discuss, and of the legislature to deter-
mine, what is the best for the public good. It is the province of the
judge to expound the law only; * * * not to speculate upon what is
the best, in his opinion, for the advantage of the community."
Despite this undeniably forceful objection to any purely utilitarian
-- which means, in effect, to any unprecedented-decision, courts
do constantly render such decisions. And if the common law is to
be an expression of developing ideas of right rather than a petrify-
ing formulation of quondam beliefs, courts must continue to pro-
vide the vital metabolism by eliminating obsolete ideas and formu-
lating into law those new theories which have prevailed in the
conflict of ideas. When judges base their opinions, in these pro-
below the stated price it held to be criminal. Justices Holmes and Brandeis
dissented.
But in U. S. v. United Store Machine Co., 247 U1. S. 32 (1917), the court
said that the foregoing holdings do not apply where the patentee has only
eased the chattel, and that in such cases he may limit the use, and may
restrict even the collateral acts of the user as a condition of the right to use
at all.
'Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 H. C. L. 1, 12 (853).
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gressing decisions, upon facts as they exist, or upon truly prevailing
beliefs, they are, in a measure at least, selecting a rule; they- are
restricted by a certain fitness of coficlusion, to the facts. But when
the very facts upon which such a conclusion is based are themselves
empirical conclusions of the judicial mind, then there can be no
pretense of anything but judicial free-will in the decision, and it is
open to all the objections raised by Baron Parke.
The action of the Supreme Court in precluding restrictions upon
the use or alienation of chattels seems most obviously to fall within
the latter class, however wise the rule may be in fact. There is no
doubt that the decisions were based on the majority idea of sound
"public policy." Although there is much discussion of precedent
as though the decision might be predicated thereon, in each case
the court does expressly justify itself on the ground of public expe-
diency, and it could not otherwise have evaded the frequent prior
judicial approval of such restrictions. -As Mr. Justice Holmes said
flatly, in his dissenting opinion in the Dr. Miles Medical Co. case,"
"There is no body of precedent that by ineluctable logic requires
the conclusion to which the court has come. The conclusion is
reached by extending a certain conception of public policy to a new
sphere."
But in thus upsetting what had theretofore "become a rule of
property," the majority of the court neither discussed the pro and
con of public policy nor considered evidence in regard to it. It is
most unusual for a court to render a decision based on precedent,
the field in which above all others judges have peculiar knowledge,
without expounding the precedents chosen as controlling and
weighing the merits of those rejected. Not infrequently a court
has expressly demanded instruction in precedent from the attorneyz
concerned in the case. Yet in none of the decisions under discus-
sion did the court really consider and analyze the business condi-
tions and economic needs of the country upon which- alone an opinion
of political expediency should be predicated. Neither did the court
ask for instruction as to such conditions and the economic value or
detriment of restriction upon the enjoyment of chattels. The deci-
sions were undeniably personal.
That men who are acquainted by experience and special study
220 U. S., page 44r.
PUBLIC POLICY AND OPINION
with the practical business conditions which these decisions affect
are not altogether in accord with this judicial idea of what is best
for the country is equally undeniable.6 0
The extent to which such empiricism may lead a court is shown
in the otinion of the.New York court v'jhich held unconstitutional
a statute aimed at bettering conditions in the slums of New York
City and alleviating the frightful conditions prevailing in crowded
tenement houses. The court's reason was that "It cannot be con-
ceived how the cigarmaker is to be improved in health or morals
by forcing him from his (tenement) home and its hallowed asso-
ciation and beneficent influences to ply his trade elsewhere."61
In deciding the case of Muller v. Oregon, 62 the court followed
the logical course in studying counsel's elaborate presentation of the
actual conditions which the statute, whose necessity to the public
good was under consideration, was designed to affect. They were
judges "more learned than wittie, * * * and more advised than con-
fident."0 3 When courts do render decisions founded on their own
' A powerful argument, on economic grounds, in favor of the enforce-
ment of restrictions upon the right of resale is given by Harry S. Gleick in
24 Case & Comment, 193. He cites a number of other students of economics
in support. See also "Predatory Price Cutting and Unfair Trade," by Edward
S. Rogers, 27 HAMy. L. Rgv. 139. The United States Chamber of Commerce
has gone on record as favoring the validity of certain restrictions upon the
right of resale. Chicago Herald, May ig, i919, page 13.
In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98.
62 208 U. S. 412. The effect of considering the facts is shown in two
New York decisions. In People v. Williams, 189 N. Y. 131, the court invali-
dated a statute prohibiting women from working in factories at night. Not
one word as to the practical effect of the law, or as to the conditions which
called it forth, appears in the opinion. In People v. Schweinler Press, 214
N. Y. 395, after a discussion of the physical effect of such night work and
a consideration of conditions as shown by the report of the Factory Investi-
gating Committee, the court flatly reversed its earlier decision and held a
similar statkite to be valid.
Compare, also, the reasoning of the different decisions in Rodgers v.
Coler, 166 N. Y. i, and Ryan v. City of New York, 177 N. Y. 271; Ritchie
v. People, 155 Ill. 98, and Ritchie & Co. v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509. Scientific
opinion was the basis of the decision in Washington v. Feilen, 7o Wash. 65,
41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 418.
' 3Compare, "In Lochner v. New York, x98 U. S. 45, the state authority
in the specific instance was denied because no reasonable relation was dis-
cernible to the majority between a ten-hour law for bakers and the public
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conceptions of public policy, whether they call the decisions "con-
clusions of fact" or applications of "law," the very public good
which they are seeking requires adherence to the principle that, in
the words of Mr. Justice Brandeis, "To decide wisely it is neces-
sary to consider the relevant facts, industrial and commercial."
JOHN BARKER XVAITE.
University of Michigan Law School.
welfare. This judgment was based upon a view of the nature of the baker's
employment beyond ten hours as known 'to the common understanding.' It
is now clear that 'common understanding' is a treacherous criterion both as
to the assumptions on which such understanding is based and as to the evil
consequences, if they are allowed to govern. The subject is one for scientific
scrutiny and critique, for authoritative interpretation of accredited facts."
Argument of counsel in Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426, citing Pound,
"Liberty of Contract," 18 YAL L. J. 48o.
Mr. James A. Veasey in his article on "The Law of Gas and Oil," 18
MICH. L. Rzv. 454, points out that a certaifn line of decisions regarding oil
and gas leases has been made on an utterly false assumption of fact. This
error arises because "in the later cases the courts do not receive proof upon
the nature of oil and gas, nor have their views in this regard kept pace with
the expansion of practical and scientific knowledge upon the subject. Inas-
much as they predicate their conception of the matter upon judicial knowl-
edge alone, the expressions found in the earlier decisions relating to the
question are persistently repeated in the later cases. Hence the error perse-
veres."
